Quality of government regulated goods by Moszoro, Marian
 
 


































IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Av. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Phone: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Phone: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 




October, 2010  
 














Regulators face the difficult task of determining the sets of price and quality of government-
regulated goods. While the profit-maximizing monopoly always produces less in quantity than 
under free competition, the level of quality produced by the monopoly is not unequivocal: it 
depends on its cost and demand functions. The social effect of quality change is not 
unequivocal, either, because it depends, apart from the cost function change, on the shift and 
tilt change of the demand curve. The problem lies in determining how the price elasticity of 
basic-need goods responds to quality change and whether this change of quality is socially 
desirable. This paper analyzes quality as a decision variable in the government-regulated goods 
sector. Because the quality of government-regulated goods remains an externality, in particular 
cases the optimal level of the quality of these goods can be determined. Paradoxically, rate-of-
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1. Introduction and Structure of the Paper 
Two conditions determine the investments in regulated utilities and public infrastructure: the 
quality level aimed for and the sunk cost in infrastructure adequate to the quality target, i.e., 
liquidity risk. In this paper, I analyze quality – often treated as constant or exogenous – as a 
decision variable in the government-regulated goods sector. I show that it is possible to 
determine the optimal quality level of these goods, which facilitates the regulator’s task of 
controlling the level of quality. 
Section 2 presents the main milestones of economic thought on quality. In section 3, I analyze 
the effect of quality change on demand price elasticity for government-regulated goods, which 
has been an area neglected by economists. In section 4, I build the cost and demand functions 
taking into account the level of quality and analyze the effect of quality change on welfare, i.e., 
whether quality changes are socially desirable. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of quality as 
an externality and the application of Coase Theorem to the quality of government-regulated 
goods. Section 6 concludes with efficiency and social implications of regulations.  
2. Relation to the Literature 
The research on demand and regulation of quality in government-regulated goods has been 
quite recent (Auriol, 1998, p. 170). The first research was connected with the American health 
system (PPS) and the mechanism of rewarding hospitals. Johnson (1984) and Broyles and Rosko 
(1985) studied the stimuli for offering high-quality services. Tirole (1994) analyzed the elasticity 
of demand in relation to quality, while Lewis and Sappington (1991) examined the effect of 
optimal regulations on the fact that quality can be contracted. The idea that economic agents 
appointed to perform multiple objectives (for example, providing high quality at low cost) tend 
to put more effort into those objectives which are best rewarded was formally developed and 
analyzed by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). Laffont and Tirole (1993) presented two models 
for regulating quality: one, in which quality is observable ex ante, and another, in which 
quality is observable only ex post. They came to the conclusion that incomplete information 
about the producer leads to a decrease in quality, and they analyzed how stimuli to increase 
quality affect demand and supply functions. Auriol (1998) analyzed the effect of competition on 
quality demand and stated that quality has features similar to public goods. Tangerås (2002),  
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while acknowledging achievements in the quality-regulation field, claimed that not much had 
been done up to that point. In the government-regulated goods sector, where the demand of a 
particular consumer depends on quality (for example, healthcare), he proposed de-regulation of 
costs and quality, and producer rewards linked to regulated measures (yardstick competition). 
The quality of consumer goods has rarely been analyzed in economic categories.
1 Baumol and 
Blinder (1988), Fischer et al. (1990), Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Samuelson and Marks (1998), and 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985) ignore the issue of quality completely. On the other hand, 
economists give quality high importance when the subject of analysis is the quality of 
government-regulated goods. Stiglitz (1997, pp. 435-437) devotes a few pages to the issue of 
quality when he describes the consumer’s perception of quality on the basis of prices on 
markets with incomplete information. Gwartney and Stroup (1987, p. 197) only claim that it is 
easier to regulate price than quality in natural monopolies. Varian (1992, pp. 239-241) analyzes 
the quality of goods generally. He treats quality as a good with a production cost. The increase 
of the quality can be decomposed, according to Varian, in two effects: an upward shift of the 
demand curve and a change of the demand curve tilt. While the profit-maximizing monopoly 
always produces less in quantity than under free competition, the level of quality produced by 
the monopoly is not unequivocal: it depends on the cost and demand functions. Neither is the 
social effect of quality change unequivocal, because it depends, apart from the cost function 
change, on the shift and tilt change of the demand curve. Nevertheless, Varian does not give 
any guidelines on how to analyze the changes in position and tilt of the demand curve. 
Tirole (1994, p. 106) divides goods, on the basis of our knowledge about their level of quality, 
into: 
−  Goods whose quality can be learned before use (search goods). 
−  Goods whose quality can be learned during use or ex post (experience goods). 
−  Goods whose quality cannot be learned even after use (credence goods, for example 
we never know all the ingredients of some products).
2  
Most goods have characteristics of more than one group. In my opinion, government-regulated 
goods are experience goods.
3 In the case of these goods, according to Tirole, the basic issue is 
information: how customers learn about quality and what stimuli companies have to produce 
goods at a given level of quality. He proves that the better informed customers are about the 
level of quality ex ante, the more the producer is motivated to produce goods of higher quality 
(Tirole, 1994, p. 108). Although Tirole does not explain this explicitly, his remarks refer only to 
standardized consumer goods or to goods which have close substitutes. 
                                              
1 Marketing theoreticians and specialists pay much more attention to the issue of quality. 
2 The first two categories were introduced by Nelson (1970); the third category was introduced by Arrow (1963) and 
Darby and Karni (1973). 
3 Government-regulated goods can be regarded as credence goods because of the uncertainty about their ultimate 
effect on health and the environment. Customers tend to see credence goods in services such as water supply, trash 
collection and energy. However, this remark in fact can refer to all products in general (cars, mobile phones, etc.), 
not only to government-regulated goods.   
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3. Effect of Quality Change on the Demand Curve
4 
If goods produced by the monopoly have close substitutes,
5,6 increasing the quality level 
differentiates the product from its substitutes and the customer is willing to pay more for it. 
Changes in prices have a smaller effect on quantity changes,
7 i.e., the demand curve becomes 
steeper.
8 If goods produced by the monopoly do not have close substitutes, as is the case with 
basic-need goods and most government-regulated goods, the demand curve also becomes 
steeper: even if quantitative demand changes are only slightly affected by quality increase, 
utility from consumption will be higher.
9 
As for the magnitude of demand change due to quality change, the shift of the demand curve 
will be bigger for goods which do not have close substitutes than for those which do. This 
results from the fact that substitutes create a cap for price increases (relative prices equal 
relative marginal utility of substitutes). 
The tilt change will also be bigger for goods without close substitutes, because customers are 
willing to pay more for additional quality of a good which has close substitutes, but if the price 
increases at a given level of quality, customers switch demand to substitutes. Such an action 
cannot take place in the case of goods without close substitutes; therefore an increase in utility 
resulting from higher quality is reflected in an increase of consumer surplus together with a 
decrease of demand price elasticity. Figure 1 illustrates shifts and tilts in a demand curve due 








                                              
4 Both in theory and in practice, the issue of the effect of quality on demand is complex. In this paper, I limit my 
argument to natural monopoly theory in government-regulated goods. 
5 Examples of goods produced by a monopoly with close substitutes are land telephone lines vs. mobile phone, and 
natural gas from the grid vs. natural gas sold in cylinders. 
6 The differentiation of goods produced by the monopoly depending on whether they have close substitutes or not is 
analytical and does not point to Hicksean substitution effects. 
7 If price were important, the consumer would buy a cheaper substitute. 
8 This statement is easier to prove a contrario, i.e., taking a decrease in quality as an example. If the product has 
close substitutes and quality decreases, consumers will pay a lower price at a given demand level, but with every 
increase in price they will limit demand for this good more sharply, or switch to a substitute. In a widely discussed 
article, Stiglitz (1987) claimed that, in standard economic theory, price depends on quality. But when quality is 
unknown, perceived quality depends on price (Stiglitz, 1987, p. 3). 
9 Let quality be a dimension, besides price and quantity. Therefore, instead of a demand curve there would be a 
‘demand surface,’ and quality change results in a different section of the surface (in a two-dimensional plot: a 
different curve), without change of preferences. Changes in preferences would change the location of the whole 
demand surface.  
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Figure 1 
Effect of quality change on the demand curve 
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p – price; q – quality; x – amount of good. 
 
An increase of quality always negatively affects the demand curve slope, i.e., the demand curve 
becomes steeper. I cannot find an example of a good for which an increase in quality would 
mean a flatter demand curve.
10 However, greater tilt does not mean lower demand price 
elasticity. As said before, an increase of quality brings two effects: the upward shift of the 
demand curve and the change of its tilt. The upward shift means, ceteris paribus, an increase of 
the demand price elasticity. After an increase in quality, the demand price elasticity will, 
therefore, be the outcome of two components: its increase, as a result of the demand curve 
shift, and its decrease, resulting from the change of the demand curve tilt.
11  
An increase in the quality of first-need goods does not have to cause a quantitative increase of 
demand or an increase of expenses on such goods, even if the supply curve does not change. 
                                              
10 This question should rather be directed at Hal Varian, who accepts such a possibility (Varian, 1992, p. 240). 
11 A simple example will illustrate it clearly. Let a demand curve be x = 100 – 10p. A change of quality will cause 
the shift of the demand curve (effect 1) and the demand curve will now be x = 120 – 10p. The demand is now more 
price elastic at every point, because the same percentage quantitative change in demand corresponds to the same 
absolute but smaller percentage price change. Let us assume further that the change of quality also changes the 
demand curve tilt into a steeper one (effect 2), so that x = 120 – 12p. It can be easily noticed that the price elasticity 
of this demand curve is the same as that of the original demand curve.  
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For example, if natural gas, coal and petrol become more powerful, in order to achieve the 
same effect, a smaller amount of them would be used.
12 
The problem of quality rests in the fact that it is not a ‘product,’ as Varian (1992, p. 239) claims, 
but an ‘accident,’ i.e., an entity contingent upon the existence of a certain product or service.
13 
It is difficult to capture or measure it (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington 2000, p. 403). There is 
no ‘price for quality,’ either, but there is price for a good of a certain quality. Therefore it is 
difficult to generalize, and each type of good or service should be approached individually. 
Tangerås (2002) analyzes the market of public medical services in the United States, where 
there is competition between service providers, while prices of medical services are regulated. In 
this case, demand is reported where the quality offered is the highest. Fabbri and Fraquelli 
(2000) analyze the so-called hedonic cost functions, which take into account quality, in the 
water supply sector. According to them, the quality of water is a basic problem of the 
production process, and thus of the costs. They quote the work of Feigenbaum and Teeples 
(1983), who treat the production of water as a process which ‘changes the location (in place and 
time) of water and improves its quality.’ Each company from this sector operates in different 
environmental conditions which affect the cost structure of drinkable water production. In this 
case the authors treat ‘quality’ as a ‘cost’ of production of the same water and – focusing on the 
cost aspect – do not analyze the effect of quality on demand. 
It is very difficult to establish the ‘appropriate’ level of quality for the consumer and for the 
producer. In the case of classic consumer goods, competing companies produce goods of 
various quality and price levels, and consumers express their preferences by making choices.
14 
In the case of goods produced by government regulated companies, the problem of choosing 
the level of quality appears. If the company was selected in a simple franchising tender process 
where attention is paid mainly to price, the quality will be relatively low, because the bidding 
companies will offer the lowest possible prices. The winner of the tendering contract will be 
offering the lowest quality at the price approximating the average cost (Viscusi, Vernon, and 
Harrington, 2000, p. 403). However, this combination of ‘low price–low quality’ may not be 
preferred by consumers.
15 
                                              
12 The substitution effect and the income effect would offset each other in this case. Changes of quality pose another 
interesting feature for the analysis of the demand curve for government-regulated goods, when quality improvement 
and price increase happen at the same time in developing countries and transition economies. For example, the 
quality of electric energy, natural gas and running water increased in Central and Eastern Europe in the years 1990-
2010 after the fall of the communist system while quantity demand remained quite stable. This fact combined with 
the increase in prices of those goods would support the hypothesis concerning a fairly steep demand curve for basic-
need goods. 
13 Aristotle would say that it is an ‘accident’ of a being: although we can talk about ‘whiteness’, it does not exist on 
its own, but always in some being. 
14 For example, when purchasing a car, with or without ABS, with or without electric windows, with or without the 
airbag for the passenger, etc. The higher the expenses on the purchase of a particular good or service in relation to 
our income, the more attention is paid by the consumer to the quality of this good. 
15 Richard Posner (1972, p. 115) proposed a mechanism which comprises an ‘open season,’ during which all 
candidates for franchisees would have the freedom to offer their products to the residents of a particular area. This 
would not be just a presentation; the candidates for franchisees would try to secure real orders from potential 
customers. At the end of this period, the orders collected by candidates would be compared and the franchise would 
be given to the company which secured the highest income. In this way, the voice of every customer would be 
measured by their willingness to pay, and the winner would be the candidate who, in free competition, would be 
preferred by the majority of customers. To secure fair competition, each candidate would have to make a 
commitment that they would, if they won, provide the level of services and prices they offered in this period. If they 
failed to keep their promises, the franchise could be withdrawn and a new ‘open season’ could be announced.   
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The tender may also concern the level of quality in the form of minimum standards. 
Nevertheless, the problem arises of establishing and subsequently monitoring these standards. 
There will always be objective and subjective problems of quality regulation caused by the 
asymmetry of information. For example, it is difficult for a regulator to continually measure 
the pressure level in the whole water supply system, and the regulator does not know the 
customers’ exact preferences. 
4. Effect of Quality Change on Welfare 
A question can be raised: When is a positive change in quality socially desirable? That is, when 
does the total consumer and producer surpluses increase due to an increase in quality? 
As shown above, an increase of the quality can be described as an upward shift of the demand 
curve and change in its tilt into a steeper one. A way to describe it mathematically is to add a 




b a q x p q x p L





H – high level of quality 
q
L – low level of quality 
x
L – level of quantity equilibrium before the quality change 
a,  b – positive parameters: parameter a  reflects  the  shift  of  the  demand  curve,         
while                is a change of the demand curve tilt at point x
L. 
The cost function also changes – both fixed costs (more depreciation and debt service) and 
variable costs increase.
16 This effect can be simply described with the addition of a straight line 
with positive slope to the cost function: 
                                                                                                                                            
    As Williamson (1985, p. 334) points out, the pre-contract offering prevents a political agent from imposing the 
level of quality and facilitates choice among various price-quality combinations. 
        Although the introduction of pre-contract offering in Posner’s conception was very clever – this is the 
continuation of Williamson’s criticism – it is not usually practiced. First of all, it assumes that consumers are able to 
make an abstract evaluation of price-quality packages and that they have the time and willingness to do so – which 
poses the problem of bounded rationality. Secondly, the pre-contract offering causes the aggregation of preferences 
in a rather arbitrary way. It may, for example, happen that the package A, being the combination of high price and 
high quality, with 40% of the society choosing it, will win over packages B, C, D and E, which are combinations of 
low price and low quality, which were chosen by 15% of the society each. Can we draw a conclusion, asks 
Williamson (1985, p. 335) rhetorically, that A is socially preferred? 
    According to other economists, a disadvantage of pre-contract offering proposed by Posner is the possibility of 
non-substantial influence on potential customers, for example, paying them for a declaration of using their services. 
I understand that this is an objection to Posner’s theory. Nevertheless, if we believe in human rationality (or bounded 
rationality), we must admit that potential customers can discount other ‘non-substantial’ factors. Although it may 
seem ‘non-substantial,’ the so-called ‘pre-election party’ is part of a formal offer (also in politics). 
16 An example of both fixed costs and variable costs increasing with quality is the inverse of the estimated annual 
cost of energy not delivered. It increases with frequency of short circuits, the volume of peak demand, the length of 
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mx l q x q x
L H + + = ) , ( TC ) , ( TC   (2) 
where l and m are positive parameters. Therefore the marginal cost equals: 
m q x q x
L H + = ) , ( MC ) , ( MC   (3) 
The change of welfare counted as the joint consumer and producer surplus
17 equals: 
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H is the level of the quantity equilibrium after the quality change. 
Replacing (1) and (3) in (4), we obtain: 
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The quantity equilibrium will be at the same level (x
H = x
L) if the shift of the demand curve 
equals the increase of the marginal cost (a = m). At this quantity equilibrium level, the change 
of welfare will be positive for every b > 0. If the demand curve tilt does not change (b = 0), there 
is no change in welfare. 
If a > m, the quantity equilibrium will be at a higher level (x
H > x
L) and, analogically, if a < m, 
the quantity equilibrium will be at a lower level (x
H < x
L). It is very difficult to predict the social 
effect in this case, using the general functions of demand and supply. On the one hand, it 
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x m b a , if and only if x
H falls in the interval between 0 and 
                                                                                                                                            
5-30 USD per MWh depending on the region of the world (Morgen, M. “W kierunku jakości energii elektrycznej. 
Optymalizacja sieci dystrybucji SN,” Rzeczpospolita, December 19, 2001, supplement Energia XXIX). 
17 For simplification, I assume that the weight of 1 profit in the social surplus equals 1. That is why parameter l, 
reflecting the change in fixed cost, does not appear in the welfare function, because it is both a customer expense 
and revenue of the monopoly.  
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L H 1 . However, if m – a > b, the quality increase does not cause an increase 
of welfare.
19 It is interesting from an economic point of view that, given a demand function 
and a marginal cost function, welfare has an unequivocal optimal level with respect to 
quality.
20  
5. Application of the Coase Theorem to Quality of Government-
Regulated Goods 
The quality of government-regulated goods holds characteristics of public goods: nobody can 
be excluded from enjoying it (non-excludable) and the consumption of quality by one customer 
does not diminish the consumption of quality by other customers (non-rival). However, it is 
difficult to treat quality as another good, independent of quantity as it is definitely not a self-
existing good. Quality of government-regulated goods can be treated as an externality: desired 
for the consumer (δu/δq > 0) and costly to the producer (δTC/δq>0). 
If the basic theorem concerning externalities – the Coase theorem – is to be applied,
21 assuming 
the lack of transaction costs, the efficient level of demand for and supply of quality of 
government-regulated goods does not depend on the allocation of the initial resources and 




                                              









x m b a − − + , while the second from the fact that if a < m, then x
H < x
L. 










L q x q x p . 
20 For subsequent quality changes, a, b, l and m, do not have to be necessarily constant. 
21 See Coase (1960). Coase de facto did not formulate the theorem; it was, as he himself admits, attributed to him by 
Stigler (1966). After all, Coase’s work was so revolutionary that it inspired a lot of literature in Neo-Institutional 
Economics and Law & Economics, and it finally earned him the Nobel Prize in 1991. 
22 The bidding power of the monopoly and the regulator in a government-regulated enterprise can be analyzed using 
the Lerner’s index 
p
p MC − . The higher the index, the more bidding power the monopoly has.  
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Defining the unequivocal optimal level of quality would be particularly important in 
understanding the purpose of regulating quality and prices in natural monopolies producing 
basic-need goods or services on the basis of maximum prices and minimum quality standards.
23  
Let us assume an economy with one monopoly producing a basic-need good x with quality q, 
with many companies producing n – 1 goods in a competitive market and one consumer 
maximizing utility. Let us introduce: 
x–1 –  quantity vector of all goods except the government-regulated basic-need good. 
p–1 –   price vector of all goods, except the government-regulated basic-need good; let us 
assume that the prices of these goods remain constant and that the quantity and 
price of the first-need good does not affect these prices.
24  
n –   number of goods. 
w –   income that can be spent on goods and services. 
Thus, assuming that we allocate the whole income,











The consumer maximizes utility, defined as the function of quantity and quality of the basic-
need good and quantity of other goods, and allocates resources subject to budget constraints. 
The consumer is willing to pay a higher price for higher quality, and so resigns from other 
goods, thus expenses on basic-need goods decrease the available income to be allocated for the 
remaining goods.
26  
A family of indifference functions to various utility levels, whose variables are the quality of 
the basic-need good and quantity of other goods, can be presented as follows: 

=
+ = + + + =
n
j
j j x u q x u x u x u q x u u
2




                                              
23 Tirole (1994, pp. 113-114), discussing the issues of quality, information and public policy, uses a meaningful 
heading ‘Failure of the Coase Theorem and Product Liability.’ Tirole’s aim is to prove that the intervention of a 
regulator is necessary to achieve an efficient level of quality production. He argues that there are always externalities 
on third parties and transaction costs. Therefore, in his opinion, the Coase theorem does not have any application 
here, so the intervention of the regulator is purposeful and desirable. 
    In my opinion, talking about the failure of the theorem by denying its assumptions is a logical error. Tirole’s 
arguments do not impair the theorem, but only its assumptions and practical application. Besides, Coase himself did 
not claim that there are no transaction costs – on the contrary, he claimed that they exist and are significant. 
24 Analogical assumptions were made by Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapter 11, where they analyze externalities and 
public goods. 
25 This is a redundant assumption if we assume that savings are also a good (investment) from which we obtain 
utility. 
26 The decrease in quantity demand for basic-need goods in favor of higher quality ones, although theoretically 







j j p x w
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Using the indirect utility function  ) , ( ) (
→ →
= p w v x u  (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 




⋅ − =  p p x w v x u
n
j
j . Hence we can describe utility as the sum of 
the utility functions of quantity and quality of a basic-need good and the indirect utility of the 
goods which can be purchased with the income left after buying the basic-need good: 
) , ( ) , ( 1 − ⋅ − + = p p x w v q x u u  
Assuming a constant marginal utility of the indirect utility function,
27 we obtain a quasi-linear 
utility function: 
p x w q x u u ⋅ − + = ) , (   (8) 
i.e., the consumer’s utility depends ceteris paribus on the price and the quality level of the 
basic-need good. 
The monopoly maximizes profit, given by: 
) , ( TC π q x x p − ⋅ =   (9) 
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The set of points for                 , for which the marginal utility of the basic-need good equals 
its marginal cost, is the contract curve (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, p. 523; Varian 
1992, p. 324). The equilibria on this curve are Pareto optimal. It should be noted that, with the 
given assumptions for internal solutions, quality does not depend on the price and quantity of 
                                              
27 In other words, we analyze the basket of all goods except for the basic-need good as a single good (treated here as 
the  numéraire) and assume its constant marginal utility (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, p. 311). This 
numéraire can be the money left after the purchase of a basic-need good. 
  } { ,
+ ∈ R p q 
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the basic-need good, or on initial endowments. Thus the Coase theorem holds for quality of 
basic-need goods.
28  
The contract curve tilt with respect to the quality of a basic-need good and the remaining 
income to be allocated after the purchase equals zero (horizontal curve). Hurwicz (1995, p. 57) 
illustrates the above result for externalities using a modified Edgeworth’s box
29 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
Indifference curves, isoprofit curves, and the contract curve regarding the quality of a basic-need 





















(w – x · p)
 
Source: author, based on Hurwicz (1995, p. 57). 
 
The horizontal axis from left to right shows the income to be spent by the consumer after the 
purchase of a basic-need good, and from right to left, the price of a basic-need good produced 
by the monopoly. The vertical axis shows quality, which is a good for the customer and a cost 
for the monopoly. Curves u1, 2,... are consumer’s utility curves such that u1 < u2 < u3 and so on. 
Analogically, curves π1, 2,... are isoprofit curves of the monopoly such that π1 < π2 < π3 and so on. 
The location of point O on the contract curve depends on the bidding power of the agents, i.e., 
on the monopoly power, who aim at maximizing profit, and the regulator, representing the 
consumer and aiming at maximizing social welfare. 
                                              
28 It should be said that, in the case of quasi-linear utility functions, there is no income effect related to the non-
numéraire  good (Hurwicz 1995, p. 49). In the market of a particular good, quality and quantity make a family of 
indifference curves. A change of quality (unless it is caused by a technological change affecting costs and prices) produces 
an equilibrium along the same indifference curve, thus the income effect does not occur. 
29 Hurwicz (1995, p. 54) remarks that this interpretation was suggested earlier by Newbery (1989, pp. 211-242) and 
Eggertsson (1990, pp. 105-109). Eggertsson, on the other hand, attributes this interpretation to Haddock and Spiegel 
(1984).  
 
12 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Hurwicz (1995) proved that quasi-linear functions of utility (that is parallel preferences) are not 
only a sufficient but a necessary condition for the Coase theorem to hold.
30  
6. Efficiency and Social Implications of Regulation 
The regulator sets maximum prices and minimum quality standards.
31 If the maximum price 
and minimum quality standards are set independently from each other, i.e., if there are no 
regulatory function dependences between maximum price and quality, as well as between the 











), the regulated natural 
monopoly will aim towards the edge of the regulated contract area, to point R (see Figure 3), 
where it maximizes its profit with respect to price and quality. 
If point R is not on the contract line (i.e., if it is below or above the line), price and quality 
regulation leads to Pareto inefficient contracts. If the minimum quality standard is below the 
optimal level, the monopoly could shift along the same isoprofit curve (π3 in Figure 3) from 
point R to point O on the contract curve. This point is preferred by the consumer to point R 
(indifference curve u3). The shift from point O to point R is not possible, however, due to the 
price regulation. 





                                              
30 Hurwicz (1995, pp. 66-73) showed that all other acceptable classes of utility functions which are not quasi-linear, 
do not lead to the horizontal contract line. Probably even Coase, whose use of mathematics was limited to simple 
addition and subtraction, would be surprised by these conclusions. 
31 Quality standards of basic-need goods are regulated in appropriate bills, or in contracts between public authorities 
(e.g., municipalities) and operators. Below are some examples of quality standards by sector: 
−  In public transportation – routes, frequency of connections, timetables and fares (Love and Cox, 1999). 
−  In disposal of solid waste – frequency and times of waste collection, and insurance, health and hygiene 
conditions (Dziarski, 1999). 
−  In electric energy – annual cumulated time of constant outages (planned and unplanned) per customer (Morgen, 
M. (2001),“W  kierunku jakości energii elektrycznej. Optymalizacja sieci dystrybucji SN,” Rzeczpospolita, 
December 19, supplement Energia XXIX; Díaz-Varela, M. “El servicio eléctrico empeoró en el 2001”, La 
Vanguardia, March 6, 2002, Barcelona, p. 55). 
−  In drinkable water – organoleptic, bacteriologic and physiochemical factors; in Poland these factors are listed in 
the Ministry of Health’s resolution listing 81 factors (6 organoleptic, 7 bacteriologic and 68 physiochemical) in 
line with EU and WHO norms. In the city of Warsaw, for example, detailed analysis of water is carried out every 
few weeks by sanitary and epidemiological inspections. Only a few basic factors are analyzed daily: turbidity, 
color, smell, reaction, hardness, oxygen consumption, ammonia, chlorides, iron, manganese, chlorine, Cola 
bacteria, streptococcus, anaerobes and the total number of bacteria developed at 22 and 37 degrees Celsius 
Krakowski, L. (2002), “Czy wiemy, co pijemy,” Rzeczpospolita, No. 92 (6169) April 19, s. A4). 
32 We can say that in this case the regulator wants ‘too much’ for the consumer, who would prefer lower quality at a 
lower price, without a decrease in the monopoly’s profit. Obviously, the above model situations can be analyzed from 
the perspective of improving the profitability of the monopoly without any changes for the consumer, as well as 
improving the situation of both the consumer and the monopoly.  
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Figure 3 




























The regulator, therefore, has a difficult, if not Sisyphean task: to set the maximum price and the 
minimum standard of quality so that the consequent combination set is on the contract curve.
33 
This statement refers not only to the case of quasi-line preferences, so not only in the case 
where the Coase theorem for the quality of basic-need goods holds, but also to all cases of 
regulated monopolies.  
Legislators, consciously or not, seem to share the opinion that the optimal level of quality does 
not depend on the price and quantity of goods supplied, or on the initial allocations of agents’ 
endowments, but only on consumers’ preferences and the cost function of the producers. On the 
one hand, there are generally strict quality norms (that is minimum quality standards, which 
each local monopoly must meet, regardless of the region or the city), but on the other hand, 
local authorities have the power to change prices, when they find it appropriate.
34  
                                              
33 When experiencing the size (and difficulty) of regulating tasks, policy academicians show discrepancies. For 
example Zerah (2000), having analyzed the privatization of water supply and sewage systems in Buenos Aires 
(Argentina), La Paz-El Palo (Bolivia) and Manila (Philippines), postulates the necessity of establishing an independent 
office regulating contracts between public and private sectors. Szablewski (2003), (“Jak regulować sektor 
telekomunikacyjny. Specjalny urząd nie jest potrzebny,” Rzeczpospolita No. 63 (6443), March 15-16, on the example 
of the telecommunication system, shows that a special office is not needed, and it would be best to get rid of the 
existing ones. 
34 Public opinion surveys show that the overwhelming majority of Poles fear the freeing of government-regulated 
prices. In case of heat energy, 63% respondents claimed that freeing the heat energy prices will lead to their increase 
in the future, 4% claimed that it will not have any effect, and only 2% predicted that the prices will fall. The 
remaining 34% did not have any opinion (the survey was commissioned by Rzeczpospolita and conducted on 21-22-
11-1999 by Pracownia Badań Społecznych in Sopot among a sample of 1056 people  representing the adult 
population of Poland: results were presented in Rzeczpospolita on December 8, 1999, p. B1).  
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Rate-of-return regulation gives the investor financial certainty but, from the perspective of 
economic efficiency, it narrows the contract area (in this case as a vertical line on the right side 
of the contract area in Figure 3). Paradoxically, quality and price regulations may even exclude 
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